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USSALT TWO FOR AMBASSADOR WARNKE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT I COMPLIANCE

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON SALT ONE COMPLIANCE. IT HAS BEEN CLEARED BY ALL AGENCIES AND WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE SFRC UNDER A COVER MEMO SIGNED BY VANCE ON MONDAY AFTERNOON. ON TUESDAY, COPIES WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE OTHER 5 INTERESTED COMMITTEES. NO PUBLIC USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THIS REPORT UNTIL CONFIRMATION OF ITS RELEASE IN WASHINGTON.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROVIDE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE BACKGROUND, DISCUSSION, AND STATUS OF THOSE QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AGREEMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 049669

OF 1972 -- THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS -- WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED BY THE US AND THE USSR. IT ALSO PROVIDES A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MATTERS WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE PRESS BUT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED WITH THE USSR.

II. GENERAL

EVEN BEFORE TALKS WITH THE USSR ON THE SUBJECT OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION BEGAN, THE US ESTABLISHED, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM, AN INTERAGENCY GROUP KNOWN AS THE VERIFICATION PANEL TO STUDY QUESTIONS CONCERNING SALT, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO MATTERS OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS. DURING THE PRELIMINARY TALKS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER OF 1969, THE US PROPOSED, AND THE USSR AGREED, TO CREATE A SPECIAL STANDING BODY TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE CONCLUDED, INCLUDING QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE CONCERNING COMPLIANCE. THIS REFLECTED EARLY RECOGNITION AND AGREEMENT THAT SUCH MATTERS WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION IN CONNECTION WITH ANY AGREEMENT AS COMPLEX AS ONE LIMITING THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS OF THE US AND THE USSR.

ARTICLE XIII OF THE ABM TREATY OF MAY 26, 1972 PROVIDES FOR A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) TO, AMONG OTHER THINGS, "CONSIDER QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS." ARTICLE VI OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE PARTIES USE THE SCC IN A SIMILAR MANNER IN CONNECTION WITH THAT AGREEMENT. IN DECEMBER 1972, DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF SALT TWO, THE SCC WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 049669

SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1972 SALT AGREEMENTS, PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT FOR MONITORING SOVIET PERFORMANCE AND FOR DEALING WITH MATTERS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE. ALL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS CAREFULLY ANALYZED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE ARE DEVELOPED BY INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY-ADVISORY GROUPS WITHIN THE NSC SYSTEM. CURRENTLY, THESE ARE AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

STEERING GROUP ON MONITORING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WORKING GROUP OF THE NSC SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE. SHOULD ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATE THAT THERE COULD BE A QUESTION CONCERNING COMPLIANCE, THIS LATTER GROUP REVIEWS AND ANALYZES THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND PROVIDES RECOMMENDATIONS. THE PRESIDENT DECIDES WHETHER A PARTICULAR QUESTION OR ISSUE IS TO BE RAISED WITH THE USSR BASED ON THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP AND, IF NECESSARY, THE DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY PRINCIPALS WHO COMPRISE THE SPECIAL COORDINATION

COMMITTEE OR THE NSC ITSELF. AFTER DISCUSSION OF ANY QUESTION IS OPENED WITH THE USSR IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, THE POSITIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE US REPRESENTATIVES ARE ALSO GUIDED IN THE SAME MANNER.

III. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE US

A. LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES (SPECIAL-PURPOSE SILOS).

ARTICLE I OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT STATES: "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO START CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM) LAUNCHERS AFTER JULY 1, 1972."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 049669

IN 1973, THE US DETERMINED THAT ADDITIONAL SILOS OF A DIFFERENT DESIGN WERE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT A NUMBER OF LAUNCH SITES. IF THESE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO CONTAIN ICBM LAUNCHERS, THEY WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. WHEN THE US RAISED ITS CONCERN OVER THIS CONSTRUCTION WITH THE SOVIET SIDE, THE USSR RESPONDED THAT THE SILOS WERE, IN FACT, HARDENED FACILITIES BUILT FOR LAUNCH CONTROL PURPOSES. AS DISCUSSIONS PROCEEDED AND ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE BECAME AVAILABLE, THE US CONCLUDED THAT THE SILOS WERE BUILT TO SERVE A LAUNCH CONTROL FUNCTION.

IN EARLY 1977, FOLLOWING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS DURING 1975 AND 1976 AND A REVIEW OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ON THIS SUBJECT, THE US DECIDED TO CLOSE DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER ON THE BASIS THAT THE SILOS IN QUESTION ARE CURRENTLY USED AS LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO WATCH FOR ANY ACTIVITY WHICH MIGHT WARRANT REOPENING OF THIS MATTER.

B. CONCEALMENT MEASURES

ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE XII OF THE ABM TREATY PROVIDE THAT EACH PARTY SHALL NOT "..... INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER PARTY" NOR ".....USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS....." OF THE AGREEMENT OR THE TREATY. BOTH ARTICLES PROVIDED THAT THE LATTER OBLIGATION ".....SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 049669

THE US HAD CLOSELY MONITORED SOVIET CONCEALMENT PRACTICES BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE 1972 SALT AGREEMENTS. DURING 1974, THE EXTENT OF THOSE CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. NONE OF THEM PREVENTED US VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY OR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, BUT THERE WAS CONCERN THAT THEY COULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION IN THE FUTURE IF THE PATTERN OF CONCEALMENT MEASURES WERE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE TO EXPAND.

THE US STATED THIS CONCERN AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THE SOVIET SIDE. IN EARLY 1975, CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES IN THE USSR LED THE US TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE NO LONGER APPEARED TO BE AN EXPANDING PATTERN OF CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS. WE CONTINUE TO MONITOR SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA CLOSELY.

C. MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (SS-19 ISSUE)

ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT STATES: "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO CONVERT LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT ICBMS, OR FOR ICBMS OF OLDER TYPES DEPLOYED PRIOR TO 1964, INTO LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS OF TYPES DEPLOYED AFTER THAT TIME." THIS PROVISION WAS SOUGHT BY THE US AS PART OF AN EFFORT TO PLACE LIMITS ON SOVIET HEAVY ICBMS (SS-9 AND FOLLOW-ONS). WE DID NOT, HOWEVER, OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON A QUANTITATIVE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN INCREASES IN THE SIZE OF SOVIET LIGHT ICBMS (SS-11 AND FOLLOW-ONS). THUS, THE US SIDE STATED ON THE FINAL DAY OF SALT ONE NEGOTIATIONS:

"THE US DELEGATION REGRETS THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO AGREE ON A COMMON DEFINITION OF A HEAVY MISSILE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE US
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 049669

DELEGATION BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING:
THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER ANY ICBM HAVING A VOLUME SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST LIGHT ICBM NOW OPERATIONAL ON EITHER SIDE TO BE A HEAVY ICBM. THE US PROCEEDS ON THE PREMISE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL GIVE DUE ACCOUNT TO THIS CONSIDERATION."

THE USSR DELEGATION MAINTAINED THE POSITION THROUGHOUT SALT ONE THAT AN AGREED DEFINITION OF HEAVY ICBMS WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BY THE SIDES IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF HEAVY ICBMS AND MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT AGREE WITH THE US STATEMENT QUOTED ABOVE. WHEN DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-19 MISSILE BEGAN, ITS SIZE, THOUGH NOT A VIOLATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVISIONS NOTED ABOVE, CAUSED THE US TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS IN EARLY 1975. OUR PURPOSE WAS TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO THE DISTINCTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SALT TWO AGREEMENT UNDER NEGOTIATION AT THE TIME. FOLLOWING SOME DISCUSSION IN THE SCC, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THIS QUESTION IN THAT FORUM WERE DEFERRED BECAUSE IT WAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE SALT TWO NEGOTIATIONS.

SINCE THAT TIME, THE US AND USSR DELEGATIONS HAVE AGREED IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE SALT TWO AGREEMENT ON A CLEAR DEMARCATION, IN TERMS OF MISSILE LAUNCH-WEIGHT AND THROW-WEIGHT, BETWEEN LIGHT AND HEAVY ICBMS.

D. POSSIBLE TESTING OF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (SA-5)
RADAR IN AN ABM MODE

ARTICLE VI OF THE ABM TREATY STATES: "TO ENHANCE ASSURANCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 049669

AND THEIR COMPONENTS PROVIDED BY THIS TREATY, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES: (A) NOT TO GIVE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS, OR RADARS, OTHER THAN ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES, ABM LAUNCHERS, OR ABM RADARS, CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR THEIR ELEMENTS IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY, AND NOT TO TEST THEM IN AN ABM MODE."

ON APRIL 7, 1972, THE US MADE A STATEMENT TO CLARIFY OUR INTERPRETATION OF "TESTED IN AN ABM MODE." WE NOTED, WITH RESPECT TO RADARS, THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER A RADAR TO BE SO TESTED IF, FOR EXAMPLE, IT MAKES MEASUREMENTS ON A COOPERATIVE TARGET VEHICLE DURING THE REENTRY PORTION OF ITS TRAJECTORY OR MAKES MEASUREMENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TEST OF AN ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILE OR AN ABM RADAR AT THE SAME TEST RANGE. WE ADDED THAT RADARS USED FOR PURPOSES SUCH AS RANGE SAFETY OR INSTRUMENTATION WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM APPLICATION OF THESE CRITERIA.

DURING 1973 AND 1974, US OBSERVATION OF SOVIET TESTS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES LED US TO BELIEVE THAT A RADAR ASSOCIATED WITH THE SA-5 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM HAD BEEN USED TO TRACK STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES

DURING FLIGHT.

A QUESTION OF IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO THIS ACTIVITY WAS WHETHER IT REPRESENTED AN EFFORT TO UPGRADE THE SA-5 SYSTEM FOR AN ABM ROLE. THE SOVIETS COULD HAVE BEEN USING THE RADAR IN A RANGE INSTRUMENTATION ROLE TO OBTAIN PRECISION TRACKING; ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ACTIVITY COULD HAVE BEEN PART OF AN EFFORT TO UPGRADE THE SA-5 SYSTEM FOR AN ABM ROLE, OR TO COLLECT DATA FOR USE IN DEVELOPING ABM SYSTEMS OR A NEW DUAL SAM/ABM SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH MUCH MORE TESTING AND TESTING SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT IN FORM, WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THE SOVIETS COULD ACHIEVE AN ABM CAPABILITY FOR THE SA-5, THE OBSERVED ACTIVITY WAS, NEVERTHELESS, AMBIGUOUS WITH RESPECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 049669

OF ARTICLE VI OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE RELATED US-
STATED INTERPRETATION OF "TESTING IN AN ABM MODE." IF THE ACTIVITY WAS DESIGNED TO UPGRADE THE SA-5 SYSTEM, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN SUCH AN EFFORT. EXTENSIVE AND OBSERVABLE MODIFICATIONS TO OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY, BUT THESE HAVE NOT OCCURRED.

THE US RAISED THIS ISSUE BASED ON THE INDICATIONS THAT AN SA-5 RADAR MAY HAVE BEEN TRACKING BALLISTIC MISSILES DURING THE REENTRY PORTION OF THEIR FLIGHT TRAJECTORY INTO AN ABM TEST RANGE.

THE SOVIETS MAINTAINED THAT NO SOVIET AIR DEFENSE RADAR HAD BEEN TESTED IN AN ABM MODE. THEY ALSO NOTED THAT THE USE OF NON-ABM RADARS FOR RANGE SAFETY OR INSTRUMENTATION WAS NOT LIMITED BY THE ABM TREATY.

A SHORT TIME LATER, WE OBSERVED THAT THE RADAR ACTIVITY OF CONCERN DURING SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS HAD CEASED.

THE US HAS CONTINUED TO MONITOR SOVIET ACTIVITIES CAREFULLY FOR ANY INDICATIONS THAT SUCH POSSIBLE TESTING ACTIVITY MIGHT BE RESUMED.

E. SOVIET REPORTING OF DISMANTLING OF EXCESS ABM TEST LAUNCHERS

EACH SIDE IS LIMITED UNDER THE ABM TREATY TO NO MORE THAN 15 ABM LAUNCHERS AT TEST RANGES. DURING 1972, SOON AFTER THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED, THE SOVIETS DISMANTLED SEVERAL EXCESS LAUNCHERS AT THE SOVIET ABM TEST RANGE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 049669

ON JULY 3, 1974, THE AGREED PROCEDURES, WORKED OUT IN THE SCC, FOR DISMANTLING EXCESS ABM TEST LAUNCHERS ENTERED INTO FORCE. AFTER THE DETAILED PROCEDURES ENTERED INTO EFFECT, THE USSR PROVIDED NOTIFICATION IN THE SCC THAT THE EXCESS ABM LAUNCHERS AT THE SOVIET TEST RANGE HAD BEEN DISMANTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREED PROCEDURES. OUR OWN INFORMATION WAS THAT SEVERAL OF THE LAUNCHERS HAD NOT, IN FACT, BEEN DISMANTLED IN COMPLETE ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE DETAILED PROCEDURES.

EVEN THOUGH THE LAUNCHERS WERE DEACTIVATED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PROCEDURES, AND THEIR REACTIVATION WOULD BE OF NO STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE, THE US RAISED THE MATTER AS A CASE OF INACCURATE NOTIFICATION OR REPORTING TO MAKE KNOWN OUR EXPECTATION THAT IN THE FUTURE CARE WOULD BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT NOTIFICATION, AS WELL AS DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, WAS IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED PROCEDURES.

F. SOVIET ABM RADAR ON KAMCHATKA PENINSULA

ARTICLE IV OF THE ABM TREATY STATES: "THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE III (ON DEPLOYMENT) SHALL NOT APPLY TO ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS USED FOR DEVELOPMENT OR TESTING, AND LOCATED WITHIN CURRENT OR ADDITIONALLY AGREED TEST RANGES..." IN OCTOBER, 1975, A NEW RADAR WAS INSTALLED AT THE KAMCHATKA IMPACT AREA OF THE SOVIET ICBM TEST RANGE. SINCE ARTICLE IV EXEMPTS FROM THE LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE III ONLY THOSE ABM COMPONENTS USED FOR DEVELOPMENT OR TESTING AT CURRENT OR ADDITIONALLY AGREED RANGES, LOCATION OF THIS RADAR, WHICH THE US IDENTIFIED AS AN ABM RADAR, ON THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA COULD HAVE CONSTITUTED ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SOVIET ABM TEST RANGE.

THIS SITUATION, HOWEVER, WAS MADE AMBIGUOUS BY TWO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 049669

FACTS: (1) JUST PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS IN 1972, THE US PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION A LIST OF US AND SOVIET ABM TEST RANGES WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE KAMCHATKA IMPACT AREA. THE SOVIET SIDE NEITHER CONFIRMED NOR DENIED THE ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF THE US LISTING, AND INDICATED THAT USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ASSURED AGAINST MISUNDER-

STANDING OF ARTICLE IV; AND (2) THE PRESENCE OF AN OLDER TYPE ABM RADAR COULD BE VIEWED AS HAVING ESTABLISHED THE KAMCHATKA IMPACT AREA AS AN ABM TEST RANGE AT THE TIME THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED.

THOUGH THE LOCATION OF A NEW ABM RADAR ON KAMCHATKA WAS NOT STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED WITH THE SOVIET SIDE IN ORDER TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

WE BROUGHT THE SITUATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE. THE USSR INDICATED THAT A RANGE WITH A RADAR INSTRUMENTATION COMPLEX EXISTED ON THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE ABM TREATY AND THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE KAMCHATKA RANGE A CURRENT TEST RANGE WITHIN THE MEANING ARTICLE IV OF THE ABM TREATY. THE US CONTINUED THE EXCHANGE TO ESTABLISH THAT KAMCHATKA IS AN ABM TEST RANGE, THAT SARY SHAGAN AND KAMCHATKA ARE THE ONLY ABM TEST RANGES IN THE USSR, AND THAT ARTICLE IV OF THE ABM TREATY REQUIRES AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL TEST RANGES.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KAMCHATKA IS AN ABM TEST RANGE AND THAT IT AND SARY SHAGAN ARE THE ONLY ABM TEST RANGES IN THE USSR. ON THE THIRD POINT, DISCUSSIONS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 049669

ARE CONTINUING ON HOW PROPERLY TO SATISFY THE NEED FOR DISCUSSING AND AGREEING UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ABM TEST RANGE. AGREEMENT APPEARS NEAR ON THIS MATTER.

G. SOVIET DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF REPLACED ICBM LAUNCHERS

UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO OF MAY 26, 1972, THE USSR WAS PERMITTED TO HAVE NO MORE THAN 950 SLBM LAUNCHERS AND 62 MODERN, NUCLEAR-POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. IN ADDITION, IT WAS PROVIDED THAT SOVIET SLBM LAUNCHERS IN EXCESS OF 740 MIGHT BECOME OPERATIONAL ONLY AS REPLACEMENTS FOR OLDER ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, WHICH WOULD BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED UNDER AGREED PROCEDURES. SUCH PROCEDURES

WERE DEVELOPED IN THE SCC, AND BECAME EFFECTIVE ON JULY 3, 1974. THE PROCEDURES INCLUDE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION ACTIONS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, THEIR TIMING, AND NOTIFICATION ABOUT THEM TO THE OTHER PARTY.

BY EARLY 1976, THE SOVIETS HAD DEVELOPED A REQUIREMENT TO DISMANTLE 51 REPLACED LAUNCHERS. IT SOON BECAME APPARENT TO THE US THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY NOT COMPLETE ALL THE REQUIRED DISMANTLING ACTIONS ON ALL OF THE LAUNCHERS ON TIME. THEREFORE, THE US DECIDED TO RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT BEFORE WE COULD DO SO, THE NOTIFICATION CONCERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN THE SCC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE DISMANTLING OF 41 OLDER ICBM LAUNCHERS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED IN THE REQUIRED TIME PERIOD. THE SOVIET SIDE EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND PREDICTED THAT ALL THE DISMANTLING ACTIONS WOULD BE COMPLETED BY JUNE 1, 1976 AND AGREED TO THE US DEMAND THAT NO MORE SUBMARINES WITH REPLACEMENT SLBM LAUNCHERS BEGIN SEA TRIALS BEFORE SUCH
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 049669

COMPLETION. BOTH CONDITIONS WERE MET. SINCE THAT TIME, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE OBSERVED SOME MINOR PROCEDURAL DISCREPANCIES AT A NUMBER OF THOSE DEACTIVATED LAUNCH SITES AND AT OTHERS AS THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS CONTINUED, ALL THE LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN IN A CONDITION THAT SATISFIED THE ESSENTIAL SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS, WHICH ARE THAT THEY CANNOT BE USED TO LAUNCH MISSILES, AND CANNOT BE RE-ACTIVATED IN A SHORT TIME. AS NECESSARY, WE HAVE PURSUED THE QUESTION OF COMPLETE AND PRECISE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGREED PROCEDURES.

H. CONCEALMENT AT TEST RANGE

PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PERTINENT TO THIS DISCUSSION ARE:

ARTICLE V.3: "EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT....."

AGREED STATEMENT CONCERNING LAUNCHER DIMENSIONS: "....IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED."

AGREED STATEMENT CONCERNING TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS: ".....THERE SHALL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS OR IN THE NUMBER OF SUCH LAUNCHERS FOR MODERN LAND-BASED HEAVY ICBMS...CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AT TEST RANGES SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 049669

PURPOSES OF TESTING AND TRAINING."

IN EARLY 1977, WE OBSERVED THE USE OF A LARGE NET COVERING OVER AN ICBM TEST LAUNCHER UNDERGOING CONVERSION AT A TEST RANGE IN THE USSR.

THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN THE US THAT THIS SUBJECT COULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION IN SALT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH A SALT TWO AGREEMENT. THE SUBJECT WAS INITIALLY RAISED IN THIS CONTEXT.

IN ADDITION, WE ALSO EXPRESSED OUR VIEW THAT THE USE OF A COVERING OVER AN ICBM SILO LAUNCHER CONCEALED ACTIVITIES FROM NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND COULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, SPECIFICALLY, THE PROVISION WHICH DEALT WITH INCREASES IN DIMENSIONS OF ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS AS RECORDED IN THE AGREED STATEMENT QUOTED ABOVE. THE US TOOK THE POSITION THAT A COVERING WHICH CONCEALS ACTIVITIES AT AN ICBM SILO FROM NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION COULD REDUCE THE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO MUTUAL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS.

IT HAS BEEN THE SOVIET POSITION THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION. NEVERTHELESS, THEY SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED THE NET COVERING.

IV. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE USSR

A. SHELTERS OVER MINUTEMAN SILOS

PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT STATES:
"EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 14 STATE 049669

MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS OBLIGATION SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES."

THE US USED SHELTERS WHICH WERE EITHER 300 OR 700 SQUARE

FEET IN SIZE OVER MINUTEMAN ICBM SILOS TO PROVIDE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DURING INITIAL CONSTRUCTION AS WELL AS MODERNIZATION, FROM 1962 THROUGH 1972. BEGINNING IN 1973, IN CONNECTION WITH MODERNIZATION AND SILO-HARDENING WORK, PREFABRICATED SHELTERS OF ABOUT 2700 SQUARE FEET WERE USED. FROM FOUR TO TWELVE OF THESE SHELTERS WERE IN PLACE OVER SILOS AT ANY GIVEN TIME, FOR FROM 10 DAYS TO FOUR WEEKS DEPENDING UPON THE SEVERITY OF THE WEATHER.

THE SOVIETS RAISED THIS SUBJECT, TAKING THE POSITION THAT THE ACTIVITY WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT SINCE IT COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT, AND THAT, THEREFORE, IT SHOULD CEASE. THE US, BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE SHELTERS AND THEIR USE STRICTLY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES, NOT FOR CONCEALMENT, BELIEVED THAT THEIR USE WAS CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE V.

IN EARLY 1977, THE US DECIDED TO MODIFY THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SHELTERS OVER MINUTEMAN ICBM SILOS BASED ON EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMON VIEW SHARED BY US AND THE SOVIETS THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD USE SHELTERS OVER ICBM SILOS THAT IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. OUR USE OF SHELTERS HAS RECENTLY BEEN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 15 STATE 049669

MODIFIED BY REDUCING THEIR SIZE ALMOST 50 PERCENT IN RECOGNITION OF THAT UNDERSTANDING.

B. ATLAS AND TITAN-I LAUNCHERS

THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS NOTED ABOVE, PROVIDES DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR DISMANTLING ICBM LAUNCHERS AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, ONE PRINCIPLE OF WHICH IS THAT REACTIVATION OF DISMANTLED LAUNCHERS SHOULD TAKE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE TIME THAN CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW ONE.

THERE ARE 177 FORMER LAUNCHERS FOR THE OBSOLETE ATLAS AND TITAN-I ICBM SYSTEMS AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS ACROSS THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. ALL THESE LAUNCHERS WERE DEACTIVATED BY THE END OF 1966.

THE SOVIET SIDE APPARENTLY PERCEIVED AN AMBIGUITY WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUS AND CONDITION OF THESE LAUNCHERS, BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF DISMANTLING WHICH HAD BEEN DONE AND ITS EFFECT ON THEIR POSSIBLE REACTIVATION TIME.

THEY RAISED THIS ISSUE IN EARLY 1975.

THE US VIEW WAS THAT THESE LAUNCHERS WERE OBSOLETE AND DEACTIVATED PRIOR TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND WERE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT AGREEMENT OR TO THE ACCOMPANYING PROCEDURES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION. HOWEVER, WE DID PROVIDE SOME INFORMATION ON THEIR CONDITION ILLUSTRATING THAT THEY COULD NOT BE REACTIVATED EASILY OR QUICKLY. THE DISCUSSION ON THIS QUESTION CEASED IN MID-1975.

C. RADAR ON SHEMA ISLAND

ARTICLE III OF THE ABM TREATY STATES: "EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS EX-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 16 STATE 049669

CEPT...WITHIN ONE ABM DEPLOYMENT AREA...CENTERED ON THE PARTY'S NATIONAL CAPITAL...AND WITHIN ONE DEPLOYMENT AREA...CONTAINING ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS..."

IN 1973, THE UNITED STATES BEGAN CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PHASED-ARRAY RADAR ON SHEMA ISLAND, ALASKA, AT THE WESTERN END OF THE ALEUTIAN ISLAND CHAIN. THIS RADAR IS TO BE USED FOR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, SPACE TRACK, AND EARLY WARNING.

THE SOVIETS RAISED A QUESTION IN 1975, SUGGESTING THAT THE RADAR WAS AN ABM RADAR, WHICH WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED AT THIS LOCATION.

THE US SIDE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE SOVIETS AND AS A RESULT, WE BELIEVE, ELIMINATED ANY CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE INCONSISTENCY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. THE RADAR BECAME OPERATIONAL IN EARLY 1977.

D. PRIVACY OF SCC PROCEEDINGS

PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE REGULATIONS OF THE SCC STATES: "THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN PRIVATE. THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION MAY NOT MAKE ITS PROCEEDINGS PUBLIC EXCEPT WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF BOTH COMMISSIONERS."

PRIOR TO THE SPECIAL SCC SESSION HELD IN EARLY 1975 TO DISCUSS CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE, SEVERAL ARTICLES APPEARED IN VARIOUS US PUBLICATIONS WITH WIDE CIRCULATION. THESE ARTICLES SPECULATED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CERTAIN SOVIET "VIOLATIONS" OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED, AND TENDED TO DRAW
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 17 STATE 049669

THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WERE VIOLATIONS, BASED ON WHAT WAS PURPORTED TO BE ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

THE SOVIETS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE WORK OF THE SCC, AND ABOUT THE PUBLICATION OF SUCH ITEMS. THEY WERE APPARENTLY PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT PRESS ITEMS THAT MAY APPEAR TO HAVE OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT SANCTION.

WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS THE USEFULNESS OF MAINTAINING THE PRIVACY OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS AND LIMITING SPECULATION IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA ON SCC PROCEEDINGS, AS WELL AS THE NEED TO KEEP THE PUBLIC ADEQUATELY INFORMED.

E. DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF THE ABM RADAR UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT MALMSTROM AFB

WHEN THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED ON MAY 26, 1972, THE US HAD ABM DEFENSES UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN TWO DEPLOYMENT AREAS FOR THE DEFENSE OF ICBMS. SINCE THE ABM TREATY PERMITTED EACH PARTY ONLY ONE SUCH ABM SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT AREA, THE US IMMEDIATELY HALTED THE CONSTRUCTION, WHICH WAS IN THE EARLY STAGES, AT MALMSTROM AFB, MONTANA. SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF THE ABM FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT MALMSTROM WERE NEGOTIATED AS PART OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, SIGNED ON JULY 3, 1974.

DISMANTLING OF THE ABM FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT MALMSTROM WAS COMPLETED BY MAY 1, 1974.

IN LATE 1974, WE NOTIFIED THE USSR IN THE SCC THAT DISMANTLING ACTIVITIES AT THE MALMSTROM SITE HAD BEEN COMPLETED. SOMEWHAT LATER, THE SOVIET SIDE RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT ONE DETAILED ASPECT OF THE DISMANTLING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 18 STATE 049669

WHICH THEY APPARENTLY FELT HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE AGREED PROCEDURES.

WE REVIEWED WITH THE SOVIET SIDE THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE US TO DISMANTLE THE MALMSTROM SITE, AND ALSO SHOWED THEM SOME PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE BEFORE AND AFTER CONDITIONS THERE. THE QUESTION WAS APPARENTLY RESOLVED ON THE

BASIS OF THAT DISCUSSION.

V. OTHER QUESTIONS AND CHARGES

THE PROCESS OF MONITORING SOVIET ACTIVITY AND ANALYZING THE INFORMATION OBTAINED IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER ANY PARTICULAR MATTER NEEDS TO BE RAISED WITH THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED ABOVE. ACTIVITIES NOT RAISED WITH THE USSR AS AMBIGUOUS OR OF POSSIBLE CONCERN HAVE ALSO BEEN EXAMINED BY THE US. IN THOSE CASES, ANALYSIS OF THE AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHOWED THAT THEY DID NOT WARRANT DISCUSSION OR CATEGORIZATION AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENTS. GENERALLY, IT HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE TO AVOID PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS OF THESE MATTERS.

FOR TIME TO TIME, ARTICLES HAVE APPEARED IN THE US PERIODICALS AND NEWS PAPERS, ALLEGING SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SALT ONE AGREEMENTS. AS INDICATED EARLIER, THESE REPORTS OR COMMENTARIES HAVE BEEN GENERALLY SPECULATIVE, AND HAVE CONCLUDED OR IMPLIED THAT VIOLATIONS OR "CHEATING" BY THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

AMONG THE SUBJECTS MOST RECENTLY OR FREQUENTLY MENTIONED ARE THOSE LISTED BELOW.

A. "BLINDING" OF US SATELLITES CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 19 STATE 049669

SOVIET USE OF SOMETHING LIKE LASER ENERGY TO "BLIND" CERTAIN US SATELLITES COULD BE AN ACTIVITY INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IN ARTICLE XII OF THE ABM TREATY AND ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT "NOT TO INTERFERE WITH" OR "USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES" WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION, BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS. IN 1975, INFORMATION RELEVANT TO POSSIBLE INCIDENTS OF THAT NATURE WAS THOROUGHLY ANALYZED, AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO QUESTIONABLE SOVIET ACTIVITY WAS INVOLVED AND THAT OUR MONITORING CAPABILITIES HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE EVENTS. THE ANALYSIS INDICATED THAT THE EVENTS HAD RESULTED FROM SEVERAL LARGE FIRES CAUSED BY BREAKS ALONG NATURAL GAS PIPELINES IN THE USSR. LATER, FOLLOWING SEVERAL REPORTS IN THE US PRESS ALLEGING SOVIET VIOLATIONS, AND IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THOSE REPORTS, THE US PRESS WAS INFORMED OF THOSE FACTS BY SEVERAL US OFFICIALS.

B. MOBILE ABM

FROM TIME TO TIME, IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT THE USSR, IN

CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE V OF THE ABM TREATY, HAS DEVELOPED, TESTED, OR DEPLOYED A MOBILE ABM SYSTEM, OR A MOBILE ABM

RADAR, ONE OF THE THREE COMPONENTS OF A MOBILE ABM SYSTEM.

THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE A MOBILE ABM SYSTEM OR COMPONENTS FOR SUCH A SYSTEM. SINCE 1971, THE SOVIETS HAVE INSTALLED AT ABM TEST RANGES SEVERAL RADARS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ABM SYSTEM CURRENTLY IN DEVELOPMENT. ONE OF THE TYPES OF RADARS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM CAN BE ERECTED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS, RATHER THAN REQUIRING YEARS TO BUILD AS HAS BEEN THE CASE FOR ABM RADARS BOTH SIDES HAVE DEPLOYED IN THE PAST. ANOTHER TYPE COULD BE EMPLACED ON PREPARED CONCRETE FOUNDATIONS. THIS NEW SYSTEM AND ITS COMPONENTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 20 STATE 049669

CAN BE INSTALLED MORE RAPIDLY THAN PREVIOUS ABM SYSTEMS, BUT THEY ARE CLEARLY NOT MOBILE IN THE SENSE OF BEING ABLE TO MOVE ABOUT READILY OR HIDDEN. A SINGLE COMPLETE OPERATIONAL SITE WOULD TAKE ABOUT HALF A YEAR TO CONSTRUCT. A NATIONWIDE ABM SYSTEM BASED ON THIS NEW SYSTEM UNDER DEVELOPMENT WOULD TAKE A MATTER OF YEARS TO BUILD.

C. ABM TESTING OF AIR DEFENSE MISSILES

ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITS THE TESTING IN AN ABM MODE OF MISSILES WHICH ARE NOT ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES, OR GIVING THEM ABM CAPABILITIES (SEE SECTION III.D ABOVE). OUR CLOSE MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES IN THIS FIELD HAVE NOT INDICATED THAT ABM TESTS OR ANY TESTS AGAINST STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH AN AIR DEFENSE MISSILE; SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE NOT OBSERVED ANY SUCH TESTS OF THE SA-5 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM MISSILE, THE ONE OCCASIONALLY MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION IN THE OPEN PRESS.

D. MOBILE ICBMS

THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF A MOBILE ICBM IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, BUT THE US STATED SALT ONE THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AGREEMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED AN ICBM IN A MOBILE MODE.

THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET SS-20, WHICH IS A MOBILE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM, HAS BEEN GIVEN OR COULD BE GIVEN ICBM RANGE CAPABILITIES HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE PRESS. THE SS-20 IS BEING DEPLOYED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 21 STATE 049669

REPLACE OLDER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. IT IS JUDGED TO BE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS AND WESTERN ALASKA FROM ITS PRESENT AND LIKELY DEPLOYMENT

AREAS IN THE EASTERN USSR; HOWEVER, IT CANNOT REACH THE CONTIGUOUS 48 STATES FROM ANY OF ITS LIKELY DEPLOYMENT AREAS IN THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE THE RANGE CAPABILITY OF ANY MISSILE SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE SS-20, CAN BE EXTENDED BY REDUCING THE TOTAL WEIGHT OF ITS PAYLOAD OR ADDING ANOTHER PROPULSION STAGE, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE ANY SUCH MODIFICATIONS TO THE SS-20. WE HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD DETECT THE NECESSARY INTERCONTINENTAL-RANGE TESTING OF SUCH A MODIFIED SYSTEM.

E. DENIAL OF TEST INFORMATION

IT HAS BEEN REPORTED IN SOME ARTICLES ON SALT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BY ENCODING MISSILE-TEST TELEMETRY, AND THAT SUCH ACTIVITY IS CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WERE NOTED IN SECTION V.A ABOVE. SUCH ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IF IT IMPEDED VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT PROVISIONS; IT HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED TO HAVE DONE SO. IN THE SALT TWO NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAVE TREATED THIS SUBJECT IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL, SINCE SUCH ACTIVITY COULD AFFECT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER NEGOTIATION.

F. ASAT

IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM IS A VIOLATION OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH SALT PROVISIONS. SINCE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS NOT PROHIBITED, THIS PROGRAM DOES NOT CALL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 22 STATE 049669

INTO QUESTION SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS. THE ACTUAL USE OF AN ASAT SYSTEM AGAINST US NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IS PROHIBITED BUT THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED. VANCE

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